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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID S. GROW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MARWICK DEVELOPMENT, INC . ,
a corporation; DANIEL R.
SOUTHWICK; STERLING MARTELL;

~~·
Defendants-Respondents,
and
BOARDWALK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Intervenor-Respondent.
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT DAVID S. GROW IN ANSWER TO
RESPONDENT BOARDWALK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION'S
AND RESPONDENT PHOENIX DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by Appellant David S. Grow to obtain
an order declaring that Respondents have, by their defaults and

failure to cure the same, forfeited to Appellant all of their
right, title and interest as purchasers under a certain Uniform
Real Estate Contract (the "Contract") and quieting Appellant's
title to the real property which is the subject of the Contract.
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This action, as decided below and as presented on appeal' does
not involve the question of liquidated damages un d er paragraph
16A of the Contract.

The only question presented on appeal is

whether Respondents were entitled to a Summary Judgment that
they had not forfeited their interest under the Contract.

PRIOR DISPOSITION OF THIS COURT
On December 10, 1980, this Court reversed the Distrk
Court's entry of Summary Judgment which declared that Respondei·
had not forfeited their interest under the Contract.

RELIEF SOUGHT WITH RESPECT TO THE
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to deny
Respondents' Petition for Rehearing and to remand the case to'.:
District Court in accordance with its December 10, 1980 opinion
(the "Opinion").

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties are identified in this Brief as they appO'
in Appellant's Brief on file herein.

Appellant incorporates

01

reference the Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's Briei
and Appellant's Reply Brief on file herein.
Appellant objects to Respondents' Statement of fact:
set forth in their Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing
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(the "Rehearing Brief") upon the grounds that Respondents have
misstated several material facts.

Appellant submits the fol-

lowing connnents to correct the erroneous Statement of Facts
submitted by Respondents.
A.

No Certificates of Deposit.

Contrary to the representations set forth in three
separate lines in the Rehearing Brief (Rehearing Brief at 4,
7 and 9), there are no Certificates of Deposit placed with or
held by the Registry of the Court.

The Record on Appeal contains

no evidence whatsoever that any Certificates of Deposit have ever
been placed with the Registry of the Court in connection with
this case.

Moreover, the Clerk of the Court has recently certi-

fied that no Certificates of Deposit have ever been deposited
into or held by the Registry of the Court in connection with this
case.

The Clerk's certificate (the "Clerk's Certificate") is

attached hereto as Appendix "A" .
Appellant is well aware of the principles of law which
generally disallow consideration on appeal of documents or
information not otherwise contained in the Record on Appeal.
(See cases and citations set forth in Appellant's Reply Brief at

1-4.)

Nevertheless, the flagrant misstatements reiterated in

the Rehearing Brief and relied upon so heavily as the very crux
of the Rehearing Brief require submission of some evidence to
substantiate the truth of the matter.

The Clerk's Certificate

Provides the best, indeed the only, evidence on this issue.
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In any event, the Clerk's Certificate concerns only inf

.

ormatio~

of which the Court otherwise could and should take judicial
notice.

Accordingly, Appellant respectfully asks the Court to

take notice of the Clerk's Certificate in determining the trut:.
fulness of Respondents' allegations of fact.
B.

Funds Sufficient To Cure The Defaults Are Not on

Deposit With The Court.
Respondents' Petition and Rehearing Brief also gross!;
misstate the amount of funds on deposit with the Registry of t~ 1
Court.

Respondents' Petition alleges that "[i]f it is . . .

determined at trial that the Appellant's interpretation of the
Contract is correct, the Contract would be brought current fro:
payments previously deposited by Respondents into the Registrv:'
the Court."

(Respondents' Petition at 3.)

The Rehearing Brief

claims that "sufficient funds have been placed . . . into the
Registry of the Court to cure any alleged default under the
Contract, regardless of the interpretation which the District
Court gives to Paragraph llB."

(Rehearing Brief at 4.)

Simila~

statements are twice again repeated in the Rehearing Brief.
(Rehearing Brief at 7 and 9.)

The statements simply are not

true.
The amount necessary to cure the admitted defaults,
including interest at 18% on delinquent payments only, is

$ 72, 140. 01 .

The amount necessary to cure the admitted defaul:

including interest at 18% on the entire unpaid contract balance
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during the period of default is
attached as Appendix "B".)

$75,728.17.

(See computations

The Clerk's Certificate certifies

that the funds on deposit with the Registry of the Court total
$25,114.00, leaving substantial deficiencies of $47 ,026.01
and p0,614. 70

, respectively.

Whatever benefit Respondents intended to derive from
their patently erroneous and repetitive statements of their
present ability to cure defaults out of funds deposited with the
Registry of the Court must not be allowed them.

The facts are

not as Respondents claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondents acknowledge that "petitions for rehearing
are denied almost perfunctorily."
Appellant agrees.

(Rehearing Brief at 4-5.)

Al though a party may, as a matter of right,

file a petition for rehearing under Rule 76(e) (1), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the threshold for granting such petitions is
very high.

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it

"cannot grant a rehearing unless a strong showing therefor be
made."

Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah 483, llP. 618 (1886)(emphasis

added); ~ also In re Mac Knight, 4 Utah 237, 9 P. 299 (1886).
The Court has on prior occassions discussed the policy
considerations underpinning this very strict standard of review
on petitions for rehearing.

For example, in Cummings v. Nielson,

42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913), the Utah Supreme Court
explained at length:
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We desire to add a word in conclusion rethe numerous applications for rehearin s
in this court. To make an application for a g
rehearing is a matter of right, and we have no
d~sire to discou:age ~he practice of filing petitions for rehearings in proper cases. When this
court, however, has considered and decided all of
the material questions involved in a case a
rehearing should not be applied for, unle~s we
have misconstrued or overlooked some material fact
or facts, or have overlooked some statute or
decision which may affect the result, or that we
have based the decision on some wrong principle of
law, or have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the result. In
this case nothing was done or attempted by counsel
except to reargue the very propositions we had
'
fully considered and decided. If we should write
opinions on all the petitions for rehearings
filed, we would have to devote a very large portion of our time in answering counsel's contentions a second time; and, if we should grant
rehearings because they are demanded, we should do
nothing else save to write and rewrite opinions in
a few cases. Let it again be said that it is
conceded, as a matter of course, that we cannot
convince losing counsel that their contentions
should not prevail, but in making this concession
let it also be remembered that we, and not counsel,
must ultimately assume all responsibility with
respect to whether our conclusions are sound or
unsound. Our endeavor is to determine all cases
correctly upon the law and the facts, and, if we
fail in this, it is because we are incapable of
arriving at just conclusions. As a general rule,
therefore, merely to reargue the grounds originally
presented can be of little, if any, aid to us. If
there are some reasons, however, such as we h~v7
indicated above, or other good reasons, a petit~fn
for a rehearing should be promptly filed, and, 1
it is meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
~pect~ng

The grounds for granting a petition for rehearing are
narrow indeed.

In Beaver County v. Home Indemnity Co· , 88 Utah

1, 52 P.2d 435, 459 (1935), the Utah Supreme Court
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held that if

an "opinion is to be modified, it should be modified because i t
fails correctly to state the law, or for some other reason which
makes its language or statements improper or inapplicable."

The

court "cannot grant a rehearing for the purpose of dropping out
of the opinion parts unsatisfactory to counsel and leaving in [or
adding] parts evidently satisfactory to counsel."

Id.

The Court

has rightly noted that a "defeated party usually feels that the
decision is not good law, but that furnishes no ground for a
Cunnington v. Scott, 4 Utah 484, 11 P. 619 (1886).

rehearing."

In denying a petition for rehearing in Ducheneau v.
House the Court concluded:
The petition for rehearing states no new
facts or grounds for a reversal of the judgment of
the lower court. It is mainly a reargument of the
case. We have repeatedly called attention to the
fact that no rehearing will be granted where
nothing new and important is offered for our consideration . . . . A reargument, or an argument
with the court upon the points of the decision,
with no new light given, is not such a showing.
11 P. at 619.

In In re Mac Knight, the Court observed that:

[T]o justify a rehearing, a strong case must
be made. We must be convinced, either that the
court failed to consider some material point in
the case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or
that some matter has been discovered which was
unknown when the case was argued.
9 P· at 299-300.

A fairly concise summary of the standard of review on
rehearing cases is found in 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error § 988
(l962) (footnotes omitted) :
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Rehearings are not granted as a matter of
right, and are not allowed merely for the purpo
of. r7argument, unless there is a reasonable pro~:
ability that the court may have arrived at an
erron7ous conclusion or overlooked some important
question or matter necessary to a correct decision
The rehearing may be granted if the decision was
based on a wrong principle of law, as where the
decision is in conflict with an express statute
or with a controlling decision to which the cou~t's
attention was not called, or where a higher appellate court has decided the precise question adversely after the decision. Misconception by the
appellate court of the proof in a material regard
or prediction of the decision upon the appeal on~
false record, or on a record that was misconstrued
by the appellate court, may justify a rehearing.
A rehearing may also be granted in some jurisdictions to permit a proper entry of the court's
decision, or to correct an error in the opinion or
judgment describing the land in litigation.
As illustrated below, there is no sufficient ground to warrant
the Petition for Rehearing.

ARGUMENT I
THERE IS NO GROUND UPON WHICH

THE OPINION MAY BE RECONSIDERED
The Opinion reversed the Summary Judgment in which the
trial court held "respondents had not forfeited their interest
under a uniform reai estate contract".
Court held:

(Opinion at 1.)

This

"The correct interpretation of paragraph llB woula

also require determination as to the sufficiency of the tender
made by the respondents to prevent the forfeiture of the

~

The Court then held paragrai~
f 1. ts ambigu:
llB ambiguous and remanded the case for resolution
(Opinion at 4.) (Emphasis Add e d . )

°
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in order that sufficiency of the tender "to prevent the forfeiture"
might be determined.
The Petition and Rehearing Brief do not allege any
misconception or misconstruction by the Court of the Record on
Appeal; nor do Respondents claim the Record on Appeal is false.
Respondents do not attempt to correct any claimed error in the
Opinion with respect to the description of the property which is
the subject matter of the Contract.
Furthermore, Respondents are not arguing that the
Court reached an erroneous conclusion, i.e. , they do not contend
that reversal of the Summary Judgment was improper.

Also Respon-

dents do not complain that such reversal is based upon a wrong
principle of law or that such reversal is in conflict with any
express statute or a controlling decision to which the Court's
attention was not called.
The only ground asserted by Respondents in support of
their Petition, is that the Opinion fails to deny Appellant the
availability of the remedy of forfeiture upon remand.

Respondents'

position is transparently based upon two premises, both of which
are false:

(1) That the Court has not decided the issue raised

in the Petition, and (2) that Respondents have deposited into
the Registry of the Court amounts sufficient to cure their
admitted defaults.
As discussed in the foregoing Statement of Facts,
Respondents' assertions regarding the sufficiency of deposits
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into the Court are simply false.

The Clerk's Certificate

must

resolve any doubt to the falsity of this premise of Respond

en ts'

position.
Respondents' contention that this Court has not decide
the forfeiture issue is plainly misplaced.

On appeal, Responder:

raised the very issues argued in their Petition, including the
claimed authority of certain dicta from Wingets Incorporate~
Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P. 2d 1007 (1972).
Brief at 15.)

(See Respondenti

Except for the added misstatements concerning

certificates of deposit and the sufficiency of funds placed witt
the clerk of the trial court, the Petition and Rehearing Brief
are nothing more than a rehash of arguments previous made to ani
rejected by this Court.

Indeed, Respondents' claim that the

forfeiture issue has not been decided comes close to questionin!
the astuteness of this Court.
The arguments raised by Respondents in the Rehearing
Brief are merely a restatement of Argument II of Respondents'
Brief.

The Court should note that Argument III of the Rehearini

Brief is a verbatim reproduction of Argument I I of Respondents'
Brief, supplemented by the factual misstatements discussed above
Wingets was cited and discussed in Respondents' Brief.

The

Petition and Rehearing Brief present no authority or principle
. d d1:

which was not also presented in Respondents' Brief and deci e
the Opinion.

.
. .
that the
It is obvious from a reading
of the Opinion
forfeiture issue was decided by this Court, albeit against
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Respondents.

The opening statement of the Opinion describes the

summary judgment as holding that "respondents had not forfeited
their interest under a uniform real estate contract."
at 1.)

(Opinion

The Opinion clearly reverses said Summary Judgment and

remands the case for trial on the interpretation of paragraph
llB.

In remanding the case, this Court expressly acknowledged

that:

"The correct interpretation of paragraph llB would also

require determination as to the sufficiency of the tender made
by the respondents to prevent the forfeiture of the contract."

(Opinion at 4.) (Emphasis Added.)

Certainly this Court con-

sidered the arguments and authorities cited in Respondents'
Brief in deciding this case.

This is evidenced by the careful

language of the Opinion referred to above.

The Opinion plainly

decided this issue against Respondents and nothing new or important is now offered for the Court's consideration.

Respondents

point to no new fact or principle of law that would affect the
Opinion.

As stated in Cunnington v. Scott, a "defeated party

usually feels that the decision is not good law, but that furnishes
no ground for a rehearing''.

11 P. at 619.

ARGUMENT II
THE OPINION IS NOT CONTRARY TO

PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THE COURT
The major point raised in the Rehearing Brief is the
argument that forfeitures will not be enforced unless the forfeiture
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G

terms are clear and unequivocal.

The only authority cited in

support of this proposition is Winge ts Incorporated v. Bitters
-------.;_,

28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972).

It is not surprising thal
the Opinion does not quote or cite Wingets. The language from

Wingets upon which Respondents rely is ambiguous dicta at best
and could not properly be the basis for the Opinion.
A.

The Winge ts Language is Dicta.

Winge ts was a reo.

estate contract case involving a contract with three remedy
options:

the typical Uniform Real Estate Contract forfeiture

provision, a contract balance acceleration provision, and a
provision allowing specific enforcement by appropriate action.
Upon the buyer's default, the seller elected to accelerate pa)'llt
on the contract balance, and the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the seller.
On appeal, the buyer contested the propriety of the
summary judgment claiming the existence of genuine issues of
material fact concerning the interpretation of the contract's
default notice provisions.

The Supreme Court reversed the sum·

mary judgment on the basis of the existence of such material
facts.

In doing so, the Court in dicta commented that certain

rules of construction are "especially true as to a forfeiture,
which is enforced only when the terms are clear and unequivocal
500 P. 2d at 1010.

The quoted language was not, as Respondents

.
· ·
claim, part o f the h o ld ing
o f t h e opinion.
even involve a claimed forfeiture.

The case did not

At most, the statement was
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offered merely as something which would "tend to give support to
the position essayed by the defendants:

i.e., that they have

raised an issue of fact as to what was intended by the language
of the contract."

Id.

Consequently, it cannot be said that

Wingets is controlling authority which should govern in this
case, or that renders the Opinion erroneous or misleading.
B.

The Wingets Dicta is Itself Ambiguous.

The language from Wingets upon which Respondents rely
is not only dicta, it is also ambiguous.

Can it mean that

forfeitures will not be enforced as to any contract which contains
an alleged ambiguity relating to some other provision of the
contract?

Or should it mean that forfeitures will not be enforced

unless the Contract specifically sets forth a forfeiture remedy?
Or that the forfeiture provisions themselves must be clear and
unequivocal?

Certainly, the latter two constructions more

nearly reflect the intended principle of law.

Otherwise, any

ambiguity in any provision of a real estate contract would
deprive a party of its bargained-for forfeiture remedy under a
contract.
That the latter constructions are the more precise
statement of the law is evidenced by the following cases:

~es v. Thorvaldson, 15 Utah 2d 308, 392 P. 2d 43 (1964) ;

~n R. Hansen, Inc. v. Pacific Intern. Corp., 76 Wash.2d 220,
45 5 P.2d 946 (1969); Engle v. First Nat. Bank, 590 P.2d 826
(Wyo, 1979).

All of such cases focus on whether the language of
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the contract creates a clear and unequivocal right of f

orfeitu::
not whether all other terms of the contract are clear and un.
equivocal.
Respondents have never contended that the Contract
does not contain a specific forfeiture provision.

It does.

Nor have Respondents ever claimed that said forfeiture provisk
is itself ambiguous.

It is not.

Consequently, application

0;

Winge ts dictum would not result in denial of the forfeiture
remedy in this case.

CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis it is clear that the
Wingets dicta was not important enough to deserve colllillent in
the Opinion.

Nor does Respondents' emphasis on such dicta provi

grounds for a rehearing.
In all events, the Wingets dicta and all of Responden:
arguments were fully briefed and argued prior to the issuance
the Opinion.

of

The only new matters raised by the Petition and

the Rehearing Brief are certain misstatements of fact obviousli
intended as some make-weight argument for granting Respondents'
Petition.
The language of the Opinion resolves the forfeiture
issue against Respondents, and is not inconsistent with the
Wingets dicta, even assuming sue h dl..cta were applicable. ~ij~
dents' Petition should therefore be denied, and the case
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reman de d

to the District Court in accordance with the Opinion.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of January 1981.

MARTINEAU, ROOKER, LARSEN & KIMBALL

1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
David S. Grow
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In The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
of the State of Utah

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

DAVID S.

GROW,

CIVIL NO. 49,549

Plaintiff and Appellant,
SUPREME COURT NO. 16675

- vs MARWICK DEVELOPMENT, INC. , A
COPRORATION; DANIEL R. SOUTHWICK;
STERLING MARTELL7 ET AL.,
Defendants and Respondents,
AND
BOARDWALK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

***********************
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

***********************

Defendant, Intervenor and
Respondent.

w

I, WILLIAM F. HUISH, COUNTY CLERK AND EX-OFFICIO Clerk
of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, of
the State of Utah in and for UTAH COUNTY, do hereby certify
that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the Deposit

In Trust in this court:
DEPOSIT IN TRUST
CASE NO. 49,549

DAVID S, GROW
-vsMARWICK DEVELOPMENT INC.

1171-78

Checks placed in vault

$7394.60
$1747.44
$1744.44

11715-78 Order directing deposit
11-27-78 Deposited - receipt No. 90179

$12 I 641. 92

4-6-79

Tender of payment - David Olsen
Check $8737.20 payable to Boardwalk (in vault)

9-21-79

Checks 16752 $8737.20 16764 $3734.88
deposited with clerk in account
total

$12,472.08

TOTAL IN CLERK ACCOUNT

$25,114.00

I further certify that no certificate of deposit or any other
type of payments have been deposited with this court in this office.
IN vlI'I'NESS iVHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the official seal of said court at my office in Provo City, Utah
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE PAGE CONTINUED

on this 15th day of January 1981,
WILLIAM F, HUISH, CO\.)ilTY "CLERK
BY

()
.~ \ __ ~ r. : ~
~du~) ~

CHIEF DEPUTY
CLERK
\

-

'.

(
/
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APPENDIX "B"
I.

AMOUNT NECESSARY TO CURE UNDER APPELLANT'S INTERPRETATION
OF PARAGRAPH llB
1.

2.

3.

Interest at rate of 9.5% on Original
Principal Amount of $205,000.00 from
date of Contract through November 15,
1977, the date of first default

$2,434.30

Interest at rate of 18% on Original
Principal Amount from November 15,
1977 through January 15, 1981

$79,950.00

Unpaid principal (otherwise paid if
Contract had been honored)

$2,083.07

TOTAL DUE AND PAYABLE
LESS PAYMENTS MADE
TOTAL DUE AND PAYABLE
TO BRING CONTRACT CURRENT

$84,467.37
$8,739.20
$75,728.17

II. AMOUNT NECESSARY TO CURE UNDER RESPONDENT'S INTERPRETATION
OF PARAGRAPH llB
$7,521.42

1.

Cure Amount as of August 9, 1978

2.

Thirty monthly payments of $1,747.44
from August 15, 1978, through January
15, 1981

$52,423.20

Interest at 1 1/2% per month on 30
unpaid monthly installments through
January 15, 1981

$12,188.39

3.

TOTAL DUE AND PAYABLE

$72,140.01
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